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ABSTRACT 
  This paper examines the effect of a decline in health on the savings and 
portfolio choice of young, working individuals and the differences between 
insured and uninsured cohorts using the 2001 Survey of Income and Program 
Participation. We find that insured individuals are significantly likely to divest 
from risky asset holdings in response to a decline in health, controlling for 
variables such as income, age, and out-of-pocket medical expenses. Unlike 
many previous papers, which dismiss health and portfolio choice associations 
among retired individuals on the basis of unobserved heterogeneity, we find that 
our results for working individuals are robust when using fixed effects models 
in a three-year longitudinal panel. Consistent with an overall theory of risk, we 
find that the relationship between an onset of poor health and an increased 
aversion to risky assets among the insured is strongest (only apparent) among 




1.  Introduction and overview 
The economic consequences of a decline in health, particularly for those who are without 
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health insurance, are a subject of interest to researchers and policy-makers alike. Close to half of 
personal bankruptcies in the U.S. are found to be associated with medical problems that trigger 
both out-of-pocket payments and loss of income (Himmelstein, et al, 2005).
2 A negative change 
in health is known to correspond to declines in several measures of economic outcomes 
including consumption, labor market participation, income, and wealth (Smith, 1999). Serious 
and unpredictable illnesses can have devastating effects, particularly among more vulnerable 
households, those who are not covered by health insurance and who are in the bottom income 
quartile. As Poor health curtail a household labor, while increasing medical expenses, this could 
lead to lower savings, an essential element of wealth accumulation (Smith, 1999; Edwards, 
2008). Those who are without coverage should therefore be even more vulnerable to 
idiosyncratic health shocks. The cross-sectional statistics of the data utilized in this study, the 
2001 Survey of Income Dynamics (SIPP) confirm that a substantial portion of working-age 
households do not have health insurance across several demographics. For instance, 10.3 percent 
of non-Hispanic Whites were not covered by any health insurance, while 19.3 percent of Blacks 
were not covered by any health insurance. In addition, 33.7 percent of Hispanics in our sample 
were not covered by any health insurance.
3 Individuals who reported a household income below 
the poverty income threshold were 17.1 percent less likely to be covered by health insurance.  
Our main objective in this paper is to assess how households’ savings may be affected by 
health problem. We are also interested in assessing whether the probability that households 
would close their accounts, at the extensive margin, as a result of a health problem is dependent 
on health insurance coverage. We also want to examine changes in their portfolio at the intensive 
                                                 
2 This result is based on a survey of 1,771 bankruptcy filers in 5 of the total 7 federal judicial districts in 2001, and 
subsequently detailed follow-up interviews with 931 of them. 
3 We do not know from the data immigrant or legal status for the Hispanics in the sample.  
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margin, as a result of experiencing deterioration in health. We focus on the working-age 
population, defined between ages 25 and 54. The examination of the younger working 
households is of specific interest to the growing literature since much less is known on the 
economic consequence of a health shock for this group. Most studies use data from surveys 
which are done specifically to understand health issues and their effects on the older population, 
55 and over, particularly, those sampled in the longitudinal Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) 
and in the Assets and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey, which covers 
those who are 70 and above. 
How this paper on the working population could easily differ from previous studies of 
older population is threefold. Older individuals who are retired have no labor income, and hence 
their consumption patterns and portfolio allocation should differ from working individuals in 
response to any exogenous shock, including changes in health. Second, with publicly 
provisioned health insurance programs such as Medicare, which covers those 65 and above, it is 
understandable that variations in insurance coverage have been found to have no impact on the 
portfolio choice of the old  (Rosen and Wu, 2004). This may not be necessarily the case in an 
analysis of younger cohorts. Third, relative to the young, the association between savings and 
health of the old may be more subject to 3
rd factors, such as impending bequests.  
The effect of health shocks for the working-age group warrants particular attention for 
several additional reasons. The working-age group should still be engaging in active savings to 
ensure a safety net for their older years. Savings and risk diversification is therefore unique 
among workers in the process of wealth accumulation. By directly reducing labor supply, health 
shocks result in greater fluctuations and uncertainty in income sources, as well as inhibit the 
ability to save, possibly leading to risk hedging and reduction of asset holdings. This could have  
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long-term financial repercussions. Indeed, the correlation between health and income has been 
found to be much higher for those who are working than those who have retired, suggesting that 
income shifts would be more sensitive to health shocks for those who are working (Deaton and 
Paxton, 1998; Smith and Kington, 1997).  
We use the Survey of Income Dynamics (SIPP) to examine the relationship between self-
reported health status and asset holdings subdivided by risk classes. The immediate benefit of the 
SIPP for our purpose is that it allows us to conduct longitudinal analysis on individuals not 
confined to the aging population, which is nationally representative when using their weights. As 
importantly, we are able to exploit the panel structure of the SIPP and perform an “event study” 
on the effect of health changes across waves for an understudied age group in the population. 
The compact panel data should correct for endogeneity issues between health status and 
socioeconomic status, since changes in income across a small span of time as small as four 
months are unlikely to cause a change in health status.  
It is well known that the cross-sectional correlations between health and asset or portfolio 
choice may be driven by unobserved individual characteristics. We compare random-effect 
models, which fall short of controlling for unobserved individual characteristics or individual 
heterogeneity with fixed-effects models where these characteristics are netted out, assuming they 
are time-constant (McFadden 1980, Greene, 2001). Also, particularly since our panel begins 
during a recession (in 2001), which likely may have had an effect on initial asset ownership, we 
want to ensure that we observe only changes in asset ownership, which may be explained by an 
observed change in health. The fixed-effects model also offers a solution to deal with any 
possible omitted variable problem. 
It is clearly important to control for the impact of income as well as out-of-pocket  
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medical expenses. We do this in all the regression estimates. In addition, we take into account 
the magnitude of a particular health shock, that is, how severe a deterioration in health status the 
individual experiences, by examining changes across time in their self-reported health on a 1-5 
scale.  
The main results of the paper are as follows: Without taking into account heterogeneity in 
the random-effect framework, we find that poorer health is negatively associated with financial 
assets across all risk classes held by households, whether single or married, insured or uninsured. 
Most of these associations disappear in the fixed-effects model, implying an influential role for 
heterogeneity. However, robust to the fixed-effect estimates, we find adverse health events 
discourage risky asset holdings (mutual funds, stock, etc.) among individuals in married-couple 
households, and interestingly, in particular among those who are insured. We also find that 
married individuals who are uninsured are significantly more likely to close safe asset (checking, 
savings, etc) accounts. The later result stands in contrast to previous finding for the old, whom 
understandably, with publicly provisioned insurance, such as Medicaid, variations in coverage do 
not affect their asset allocation (Rosen and Wu, 2004). 
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows: in the next section we briefly 
review the relevant literature, as well as discuss issues involved in measuring and identifying 
health impact, and the way we will address them in the paper. As a starting point for our 
investigation, we conduct a descriptive analysis of the data depicting the cross-sectional 
relationship between health and socioeconomic status and asset ownership. Then we turn to the 
longitudinal analysis, exploiting the panel structure of the data, to assess the impact of change in 
health on asset holding, using comparatively random-effects and fixed-effects models. We 




II.  Literature and Issues of Health Estimation 
While much of the past literature has focused on the broad economic consequences of 
health, in terms of income, wealth, and labor market outcomes, a large and growing literature has 
started to focus on the impact of health status on portfolio choice and particular savings. The 
research is fairly unanimous, in that, negative health shocks correspond to reductions in income 
and wealth. Smith (1999) based on data from the HRS for those over 55, reports that negative 
health shocks lead to a sizable reduction in net worth. Specifically, the onset of a minor illness 
results in a decrease in wealth accumulation averaging $3,620 over a four-year period. A major 
illness resulted in a $17,000 reduction in wealth accumulation over that period.  
Health shocks effect on wealth is in part due to the out-of-pocket medical expenses (Wu, 
2003; Smith, 1999). Based on Smith’s calculation, the reduction in wealth, mentioned, coincides 
with an increase in out-of-pocket health expenditure of $635 for minor health shocks and $2,266 
for major health shocks.  
Another conduit for health shocks’ impacts on income is through a reduction in labor 
supply. Smith (1999) finds that a health event leads to a reduction of 4 hours per week of work 
and a 15-percentage point decline in the probability of remaining in the labor force. Levy (2002) 
also finds that there is a reduction in labor supply as a result of a negative health event, but not a 
reduction in hours worked, once labor market participation is controlled for.  
As argued, identifying the pathway of savings through which the health-income gradient 
may operate is particularly relevant for the working-age population. The socio-economic health 
gradient literature, argues that if poor health substitutes for labor supply, increases medical 
consumption or out-of-pocket spending, savings could fall (Smith, 1999; Edwards, 2008).  
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However, following the broader literature on savings motives across the life cycle, the effect of 
health on savings is theoretically ambiguous (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1994; Lillard and 
Weiss, 1997; Palumbo, 1999; Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2004). Within the framework of life 
cycle models, a health shock can affect savings via several (positive or negative) channels, 
depending on how the health shock alters the marginal utility of consumption and thus 
household’s valuation of risk. The literature identifies the risk of future health spending as a 
crucial trigger of precautionary saving.  Attitude toward risk is also central to the savings 
behavior. If people are risk adverse, when they are sick, they adjust their expectation of their 
future health risk, and as a result accumulate wealth to deal with future problems and expenses. 
Savings (safe asset holding as opposed to riskier assets) then could rise if the prospect of poor 
health increases (Rosen and Wu, 2004). 
The health shock effect on saving decisions also depends on whether these shocks 
increase or decrease the marginal utility to consume (Love and Smith, 2007). If marginal utility 
of consumption is a declining function of poor health (i.e., you are not interested in going on a 
vacation when you are sick), then individuals will tend to want to consume more (and save less) 
when they are healthy, then to wait for later years when they may become sick (e.g., Lillard and 
Weiss, 1997); Viscusi and Evans, 1990. Mortality risks would have a similar time preference, 
moving consumption more toward present than future (Idler and Benyamini, 1997).
4  
Empirical work has examined the effect of health on savings at both the extensive margin 
(whether the household own a saving accounts or other assets) and at the intensive margin (the 
share of their financial asset held in each risk class). The seminal study of asset allocation of the 
                                                 
4 Time preference would be mitigated by bequest motives (Hurd, 2002). Other factors that may alter time preference include 
consideration for future income, such as annuitized social security income for a surviving spouse (Idler and Benyamini,1997), 




older population in the literature is the Rosen and Wu (2004) paper, which is based on the HRS. 
Using random-effects models, this study finds that the sick tend to reinvest in safer assets, both at 
the extensive and intensive margins (asset ownership and asset fractions).
5 One possible reason 
for this, as they suggest is that the sick people are less able to absorb low asset returns by 
adjusting labor supply and therefore shift toward safer portfolio allocation, in a logic similar to  
Bodie et al (1992). Rosen and Wu also consider some of the potential mechanisms for the health 
effects including, including bequest motives, planning horizon, and risk aversion. 
The life-cycle theory predicts that health would reflect time preference and risk, among 
other factors, which would have an impact on the amount and type of assets one holds at the 
intensive margin. The theory is less clear about what should cause a person who is sick to make a 
decision at the extensive, that is to completely close a safe account or completely get out of the 
stock market. To that effect, Love and Smith (2007) make an interesting observation, regarding 
older retiring individuals, as they note that there is no reason to believe that when people are sick 
they would completely get out of the stock market, or when they become healthy, the older 
person would choose to buy stock. For poor health to cause people to withdraw, they would have 
to be “close to the extensive margin prior to the health shock”.    
What other additional factor could cause households to completely divest? A few studies 
have provided some explanations of factors other than life-cycle/time-preference that may 
explain variations at the extensive margin. In the case of risky assets, such as stock ownership, 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) explains that even small fixed costs of holding stocks could explain 
large amounts of non-participation. Other explanations for non-participation in stock ownership 
                                                 
5 Edward (2008) finds similar results as Rosen and Wu (2004) using similar random effect Tobit models, but for households in 
the Aging and Health Dynamics (AHEAD) survey. Christelis et al (2005) use a Heckman selection model, also find negative and 
statistically significant correlation between poor health and risky asset (Stock) ownership and shares for older households in a 




have been found in social interactions and communal effects for some individuals. In the case of 
savings and checking account (safe assets), a similar literature speaks to barriers, such as cultural 
differences and information asymmetry, that may keep from having a relationship with formal 
banking institutions for some individuals, which may explain in part why some individuals may 
not hold such accounts (Rhine et al, 2006). For these reasons, it is important to control for 
various other factors, including family backgrounds, etc…, (Rosen and Wu, 2004).   
Regardless of the channel through which a health event impact savings, from an 
empirical perspective, there are important identification issues that must be faced in trying to 
estimate consistently the effect of health. First, there is the potential for measurement errors. This 
could happen because self-assessed variables may not be completely reliable. This is exemplified 
in Crossley and Kennedy (2002) who report that self-assessed health status may fluctuate when 
asked the same question twice in the same survey. Self-assessed responses could also be 
distorted by mood (Schmidt et al., 1996). Also, perception about health may be influenced by 
socioeconomic characteristics, including education, availability of health insurance etc… This 
would render measurement errors associated with self-assessed health status correlated with 
other independent variables in the model. As Rosen and Wu (2004) argues, there is however 
ample evidence to suggest that self-reported health assessment is still a valid measure of health 
condition. For example, poor self-reported health is found to correlate highly with mortality 
(Idler and Benyamini, 1997). Also, studies have used in addition to self-reported health, other 
more “objective” measure of health, such as specific medical conditions, and have found results 
that are qualitatively not different than when they use self-reported health (Smith, 1999; Rosen 
and Wu, 2004).  Based on the SIPP data, as in previous studies, we will use self-reported health 
status from 1 to 5. Looking at the emergence of a self-reported “new health condition” within the  
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same households across the panel should mitigate some of the potential time-invariant 
measurement errors.   
Second, there is the well-known problem of endogeneity with health status. Wealth, 
understandably could affect health. Wealthier individuals can afford better health insurance plans 
and higher quality care, giving them a comparative advantage in maintaining good health. At the 
same time, having poor health make people subject to absenteeism, they may be in general not as 
good and productive workers as those who are healthy, they have a statistical tendency to reduce 
their labor supply, which could lead to having less wealth (Smith, 1999). In our case, as we seek 
to estimate the effect of health on savings, if it happens that savings in fact affect health, this 
would lead to spurious results. To isolate the effect of a change in health, we would need to have 
variables that affect the savings outcome only through their effects on health. The use of an 
instrument, such as a health care cost shock would be a likely candidate. Such an instrument is 
not appropriate using U.S., data, since there is private and public health insurance (Smith, 1999). 
Fortunately, we believe that there is no compelling argument to suggest that our analysis will be 
subject to this issue. The compact panel data we utilize in this study addresses the endogeneity 
issues between health status and socioeconomic status, since changes in income across a small 
span of time as small as four months are unlikely to cause a change in health status.  
Third, “unobserved” individual heterogeneity is a substantial issue that must be dealt 
with. This constitutes a greater concern for us. If unobserved random factors are omitted and 
correlated with observed variables, this would cause spurious effects of health on the economic 
outcomes of interest. For example, if we consider the case of risky assets, like stock ownership, 
poor health may directly cause a reduction in stock holding. However, it is possible that 
unobserved “third factors” such as preference and attitude toward risk, correlated with poor  
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health could also be correlated with lower stock holding. It is also possible that people’ 
backgrounds might be a factor. For instance, if they grew up in poor neighborhoods and have not 
learned as much on good health practices they may also not have learned about the importance of 
savings. If such is the case the relationship between poor health and thesaving or portfolio 
decisions would be biased.   Rosen and Wu (2004) exploit the extensive information on family 
background and on occupations of respondents to control for such potential additional “third 
factors” in their random-effect estimators.  
Subsequent to Rosen and Wu paper, some studies have used fixed-effect models in an 
attempt to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity and unobserved differences across 
households.
6 Following the literature, our empirical strategy is going to consist of comparing 
random-effects models to estimate the effect of a negative change in health status on asset 
holding with conditional fixed-effects models that estimates the effect of these changes, netting 
out unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables in the panel.  
 
III.  Data and Cross-Sectional Analysis of Health Status 
The analysis is undertaken using the 9 waves of the 2001 panel of the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is a longitudinal dataset that surveys 36,700 
households every four months.  The nine waves of the 2001 SIPP allow us to look at a condensed 
three-year period, and look at monthly household income as well as asset ownership status and 
                                                 
6 The results of these studies have been more or less supportive of Rosen and Wu (2004). For example, Coile and Milligan (2006) 
using HRS confirm the results of Rosen and Wu based on fixed-effects models, in that they find a negative effect of a chronic 
shock on the probability of holding risky asset, but no effect on the marginal share. Love and Smith (2008) use the HRS, 
however, they attribute the health-wealth correlations to unobserved heterogeneity based on fixed-effects logit (for asset 
ownership) and fixed-effects tobit (for asset fractions) in their analysis of individuals over 70. On the other hand, they do observe 
portfolio adjustment to safer assets among younger cohorts between 51 and 70. Fan and Zhao (2009) attribute wealth-health 
correlations to unobserved heterogeneity, when looking at health variables such as improper physical functioning, chronic 
conditions, acute impairment, and work-related health limitations in wave 1 and 2 of the US New Beneficiary Survey (NBS) both 
in 1982 and 1991, which surveys those exclusively over age 60. They found results consistent with Rosen and Wu based OLS 




asset holdings across several waves. We classify asset ownership in various classes based upon 
risk that is consistent with the portfolio choice literature. This paper follows Carroll (2002) and 
Hurd (2002) in categorizing assets by three classes of risk, namely safe assets (checking 
accounts, savings accounts, treasuries, CDOs, etc.), medium risk assets (retirement securities and 
bonds), and high risk assets (mutual funds and stocks). In the spirit of Rosen and Wu (2004), we 
define our asset fractions as the proportion of a particular class of asset of that individual’s net 
worth. Unlike their study, which decomposed medium risk assets into retirement and bonds in 
order to account for variation between these types of vehicles for retired individuals, we group 
both retirement and bonds as one medium risk asset class. Our sample includes individuals who 
are between the ages of 25 to 54, one of the standard definitions of working-age. We also drop 
any early retirees because those who choose to retire early often have radically different savings 
and portfolio decisions compared with their working counterparts.  
Table 1 provides a number of cross-sectional statistics that are averaged across the panel. 
Averages are shown for both married and single individuals as well as for the entire sample. 
Health status is based on the respondent’s answer to how they would rate their health on a five-
point scale, a 1 referring to excellent health, while a 5 reports poor health. In this table, we define 
as healthy, those with a score of 1 to 3 and as sick, those with a score of 4 or 5.  
Singles are on average younger than individual heads of married couple households. 
Blacks make up 18 percent of single headed households compared to 8 percent in married 
households. While singles tend to report being sick to a similar degree as those who are married 
(on average 11 percent), they are almost twice more likely to have no health insurance than 
married individuals. Twenty-one percent of singles had no health insurance, compared to 11 
percent of married couples.  
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A substantial number of single headed households have no financial asset. Only forty-
four percent of singles compared to 73 percent of married couples have a positive amount of any 
financial assets. The percentages of the financial assets held across different class categories are 
also all much smaller for singles. Only 9 percent hold medium risk assets, compared to 25 
percent of married. And only 12 percent hold risky assets, compared to 30 percent of married 
individuals.  
Conditional on having financial wealth, the great majority of it is held in medium risk 
assets. The younger households in our sample hold about 67 percent of their reported financial 
wealth in retirement or bonds, a fraction much higher than that found in studies that examine 
retired individuals (Rosen and Wu, 2004; Hurd, 2002). This is understandable since we drop 
early retirees and look exclusively at those who have yet to unwind any holdings retirement 
savings such as Keogh or 401(k) accounts.  Interestingly, couples appear to be somewhat more 
risk averse than singles, once we condition on asset ownership, in term of the proportion of their 
wealth held in risky asset class. Couples hold about 5 percent less of their net worth in risky 
assets than singles.  
In Table 2, we present additional cross-sectional averages showing how the proportion of 
different types of households based on marital status and insurance coverage, owing various 
assets, varies by health status. Again here in this table, we define as healthy, those with a score of 
1 to 3 and as sick, those with a score of 4 or 5.  The results suggest that in general sick working-
age individuals are less likely to have any asset holdings than the healthy. For example, 61 
percent of healthy people own safe assets. The analogous figure is 35 percent for sick people. For 
medium risk asset, the numbers are 20 percent for healthy people and 8 percent for sick. And for 
risky assets, the numbers are 23 percent for healthy people and 10 percent for sick people. As  
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one would expect with the well-known negative correlations between health insurance coverage 
and net worth (Smith, 1999), between only 3 to 5 percent of those who are without health 
insurance have medium or risky asset type, irrespective of whether or not they are sick.  
Table 3 compares account closings between those with and without health insurance, 
conditional on having had an account in an initial period. We subdivide individuals into those 
who become sick and those whose health either improves or remains unchanged from waves 3 to 
wave 6 as well as from wave 6 to wave 9, reflecting one year time intervals. Becoming sick is 
defined here as having had any deterioration in reported health’s score over the period. Account 
closing is defined as any negative change in the asset ownership indicator, conditional on 
ownership in the initial period. Individuals who have closed all accounts in one particular asset 
class are those who held some amount of assets in the previous period and reported no asset 
ownership in the next.  
Between waves 3 and 6, when looking at the difference-in-differences among singles and 
closing of risky asset holding, of those who do have health insurance, 13 percent who remain 
healthy close their risky asset accounts, while 24 percent who report a decline in health close 
their respective risky asset accounts. The uninsured are much more likely to close their account, 
irrespective of their health status, as 32 percent, of those who remain healthy, and 33 percent of 
those who get sick drop their risky asset accounts. 
Among couples who are insured, 14 percent individuals who remain healthy close their 
risky asset accounts, while 21 percent who report a decline in health close their respective 
accounts. In contrast, 37 percent of the uninsured who remain healthy drop their risky asset 
accounts while interestingly, a smaller proportion of 29 percent of those who are sick close their 
accounts.   
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With respect to the differences for risky asset closing between waves 6 and 9, among 
singles, of those with health insurance, 13 percent who remain healthy close their risky asset 
accounts, while 21 percent who report a decline in health close their respective accounts. In 
contrast, with the uninsured, 25 percent who remain healthy drop their risky asset accounts while 
only 20 percent of those who get sick close their accounts between waves.  
Among insured couples, between waves 6 and 9, 13 percent of individuals who remain 
healthy close their risky asset accounts, while 15 percent who report a decline in health close 
their respective accounts. On the other hand, with the uninsured, the percentage of those who 
close their risky asset accounts is the same (33 percent) for both those who stay healthy and 
those who experience a health shock. Uninsured couples without health insurance who became 
sick tapped quite heavily into their medium risk assets, relative to those who remain healthy.  
The main observations to draw from the figures in Table 3 are as follows: They appear to 
be a suggestive (negative) relationship between health and (especially risky) asset holding for 
married couples. This rings particularly true for those who are insured. We also note that married 
couples who became sick drew heavily on their medium risk asset (bonds and retirement 
accounts). By contrast, in general households were less likely to close safe accounts, whether or 
not they were healthy or became sick. Variations in health and closing of safe accounts are 
therefore fairly subdued. The patterns of the account closings and health status for uninsured 
singles were more unclear.  
 
IV   Empirical Results 
A.  Random-Effects Analysis 
We begin our regression analysis by conducting an examination of asset ownership  
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across the entire three-year panel, controlling for several factors. As a baseline of comparison 
with previous studies we consider a random effects model of asset ownership with health and 
other relevant household characteristics, followed by estimating the same model for both 
uninsured and insured individuals. The random-effect model is as follows: 
 
       Asset Ownershipit = Φ(ηHealth Statusit + Xitβ + µi + ε it)       (1) 
Where, Health Status is our self-reported health variable on a 1 to 5 scale. In light of 
Kennedy and Crossley (2002), we therefore reduce the effect of an inconsistent one point 
difference in health status across waves by using the entire 5 point scale as our health status 
regressor. Thus, any increase in their health status variable for an individual is an indication of a 
negative change in health. Xit is a vector of time-variant and invariant exogenous explanatory 
variables, µi is unobserved time-invariant individual-specific effect that follows an independent 
normal distribution, and ε it  is idiosyncratic error following its own independent normal 
distribution.  
The explanatory variables include a health insurance indicator, giving a 1 if an individual 
is uninsured and a 0, if they are insured by either a government program or by a public insurance 
program. We also include the number of annual visits to the doctor, as a proxy for out-of-pocket 
medical expenses, as has been previously done. In addition we include dummy variables for 
education, household income during the month in which the individual reported a change in 
health status, and also net worth, age, gender and race. Gender is giving a 1 if female, and race is 
giving a 1 if black.  
Table 4A and 4B (left-hand side panels) reports the marginal effects of the random-effect 
probit model of asset ownership for singles and married, respectively, by the characterization of  
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the asset class. Considering asset holdings without accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, the 
random-effects estimates suggest that poorer health exerts a negative and statistically significant 
effect on the probability of owning assets in any class. Having no health insurance also exerts a 
statistically significant negative effect on the probability of holding any asset.
7 Because  the 
significance of these health correlations is susceptible to heterogeneity, we turn next to a fixed-
effect analysis. 
 
B.  Fixed-Effects Analysis 
As mentioned, the benefit of the SIPP panel data is that it allows us to examine the 
immediate consequences of a health event and the ensuing short-term asset ownership changes 
for a given individual. In doing so, we want to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
Also particularly since our panel begins during a recession (in 2001), which likely may have had 
an effect on initial asset ownership we want to ensure that we observe only changes in asset 
ownership, which may be explained by an observed change in health. Thus we further use a 
conditional fixed-effects logit model (McFadden 1980, Greene, 2001) to estimate the 
longitudinal binary choice of asset ownership as a solution to dealing with potential 
heterogeneity and any possible omitted variable problem. The conditional fixed-effects logit 
model is as follows: 
 
Asset Ownershipit =  Λ(αi + η Health Statusit + X itβ + ε it)      (2) 
                                                 
7 The results of the other covariates are as expected. Married couples who visit their doctor more frequently (who 
tend to be economically better off) are more likely to hold some kind of risky assets. Considering age, the older the 
individual, the more likely he is to own some kind of assets in each class. Higher household income is significant 
and positively related to asset ownership and net worth is significant and positively related to asset ownership. Also, 
those with more educational attainment are significantly more likely to own assets. This is true across each category. 
Blacks are significantly less likely to own any kind of assets and married females are significantly less likely to hold 
safe and medium assets.  
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where Λ is the cdf for the logistic distribution (Chamberlain, 1980; Greene 2001).  
 
Table 4A and 4B (right-hand side panels) reports the results for the conditional fixed-effects 
logit estimates, for singles and married, respectively. Recall that any increase in the health status 
variable for an individual is an indication of a negative change in health. Hence, negative fixed-
effects coefficients for this covariate reflect a greater tendency to drop assets and close accounts 
than open new account if the individual experience a negative change in health status. 
In Table 4A (right hand side panel) the association between the health variables and any 
types of asset for singles disappear in the fixed effects estimates, in contrast to the random 
effects, implying an influential role for heterogeneity in the singles sample.  
In Table 4B (right hand side panel), first, we note that married couples who are without 
health insurance are significantly more likely to close their checking, CDO and other low-risk or 
more liquid accounts, with a fixed-effects estimate of -0.410. Focusing on the health status 
effect, unlike the previous studies, which found that health status increases significantly the 
probability for the old to own safe assets, we find that for those at a working-age, health status 
does not affect safe asset holdings on the extensive margin.
8 Also, the cross sectional correlations 
that were noted with married couples and closing of medium assets do not necessarily imply 
causality, as this association also vanishes in the fixed effects estimate. There are heavy costs 
and penalty for withdrawing retirement accounts, before being retired, which could also explain 
why working households would be reluctant to go into these types of medium assets.  
 By contrast, for the pooled sample of married individuals, the result shows that health 
status is a significant predictor of not holding any risky assets, (with a fixed-effect estimate of - 
                                                 
8 It would be of interest to know how much is held in those accounts. If the dollar value held is low, it is possible 
that they are inconsequential in the decision to response to health and high medical costs that may entail.  
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0.097). Interestingly, in Table 5, after we ran, further, separate fixed-effects regressions for risky 
asset holding, respectively, for those with and without health insurance coverage, we find that 
our fixed-effects result of a significant effect of health on risky asset is true only among married 
individuals who are insured (with a t-statistic of -2.52). A likely explanation for this is that 
married individuals (especially those who choose to purchase insurance) are generally risk averse 
across discrete choice scenarios. When they are hit by a negative change in their health they 
demonstrate risk aversion by having a greater tendency to drop their high-risk assets.  
Another alternative explanation could also be in order. According to risk and risk 
management models, in general households should be able to use savings (and other formal and 
informal means of insurance such as networks) to smooth out consumption (including medical 
expenditures) in the face of idiosyncratic shocks (Dercon, 2002; Townsend, 1995). In the context 
of health shocks, this suggests that health insurance should mitigate households’ risks. In 
practice, however, Smith (1999, 2003) and Levy (2002) find that while health insurance reduces 
out-of-pocket payments, operating on the expenditure side, it does not fully protect households 
against income risk. Following Smith and Levy findings, it is possible that insured married 
households in our sample, to the extent that they were not fully protected, drew upon their risky 
assets, which are likely to be of more substantial amounts, as a result of a negative change in 
health, to cover medical costs. This argument is reinforced by the fact that arguably, the doctor 
visits variable that we use as a proxy for out-of-pocket medical expenses is a poor proxy for 
actual out-of-pocket medical expenses that households may be facing. Income, although we 
control for it, may also be subject to some measurement errors. The potential channels of 
medical costs and labor income shocks merit further investigation.   
Given that they were so few people without health insurance and so few singles who held  
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risky assets, it is possible that the results for these groups are subject to sample size errors. But it 
is also possible that the correlations for these groups are more complex than for insured married 
households, as we noted in the beginning that their socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics vary widely. Additional analysis of the younger uninsured and single headed 
households is needed to further our understanding of these groups’ savings behavior in relation 
to health shocks. 
  
IV.  Asset Proportions in Financial Net Worth And Insurance Coverage 
A.  Average Changes in Asset Fractions 
We now turn to a (descriptive) analysis of asset fractions or portfolio decisions. Table 7 
compares the changes in asset fractions between those with and without health insurance and 
how they differ when they experience a decline in health. Between waves 3 and waves 6, 
uninsured singles that stay healthy decrease their asset fraction by 0.16 while the uninsured who 
get sick decrease their asset fraction by 0.19. This 0.03 difference in how the uninsured 
reallocate on the intensive is a much smaller difference compared to the insured whose average 
change in risky asset fraction is 0.28 lower for those who get sick. 
  The same effect is observed over the next year. For those singles who experience a 
decline in health between waves 6 and 9, the uninsured sick actually increase their portfolio 
shares 0.16 more than their healthy counterparts. Simultaneously, the insured with declining 
health demonstrate risk aversion by decreasing their risky asset portfolio share by 0.03 more than 
the insured singles who remained healthy. 
  For couples between these same waves, uninsured individuals who get sick increase their 
portfolio shares in financial wealth by 2 percent relative to those who stay healthy, a jump  
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understandably smaller than that demonstrated by uninsured singles. Insured couples display risk 
aversion again, as those who become sick between these years decrease their risky portfolio 
shares by 14 percent relative to the healthy.  
 
B.  Random-Effects and Fixed-effects Analysis of Assets Proportions Fractions 
We computed random-effects tobit estimates of asset reallocation conditional on 
ownership (not reported on a Table). The wealth fractions were defined as the amount of asset 
holdings within a specific class divided by the individual’s net worth, being applied to each asset 
class. In doing so, these estimates report the effect of health status on the fraction of asset 
holding to wealth without taking into account unobserved heterogeneity. These tobit estimates 
were censored at both zero and one.
9  With respect to the health variables, having health 
insurance has a significant effect on the asset fraction to wealth, across all classes. Becoming 
sick has significantly smaller safe, medium risk, and risky asset fractions. Hence the random-
effect analysis of the SIPP is suggestive of a relationship between health and (dissaving) 
behaviors across the board. The literature based on older households (Rosen and Wu, 2004) has 
found evidence of reallocation, but not necessarily complete divestment. This is an indication 
that the younger working age households may be behaving intrinsically different from the older 
retired households with respect to risk hedging in the context of a health shock.  
To replicate our fixed-effects analysis for asset reallocation within ownership status we 
use a fixed-effects semiparametric tobit model censored at 0 and 1 put forth by Honore (1992): 
                                                 
9 The control variables results were as expected. Age is positively correlated with asset fractions. HH Income and 
net worth are both positively correlated with all asset fractions. This result is consistent with, Dynan, et al (2004) 
who assert that the rich save more. Those who are more educated are more likely to hold more assets of any class as 
households with more education have better information about various investment opportunities (King and Leape, 
1998). Blacks have significantly lower asset fractions. Married couples have significantly greater medium and risky 
asset fractions than singles, though with safe asset fractions, the relationship is unclear. Those who visit the doctor 
more have significantly greater asset fractions across all classes. This is consistent with the fact that those who visit 




          (3) 
 
 
Where   is an asset fraction of total financial net worth,   is a vector of covariates. 
The (preliminary) fixed-effects tobit results (not reported on a table) suggest that this observed 
decrease in risky asset holding in response to a decline in health observed in the data may also be 
evident even within asset portfolio adjustment.  
 
V.  Conclusion 
Our findings show that a decline in health status among insured married couples leads to 
a significant reduction in their risky asset holdings across the three-year panel of the 2001 
Survey of Income and Program Participation. We find that these results are consistent across 
both, account closings and asset reallocation within portfolios, the latter on a preliminary basis. 
We confirm that the result on health and risky asset is not due to any form of unobserved 
heterogeneity by using fixed-effects models for both intensive and extensive margins. We 
suggest that these results are ultimately supported by a general theory of risk, that is, individuals 
who demonstrate risk aversion in their purchase of health insurance also demonstrate risk 
aversion in divesting their risky asset holdings. This finding is also suggestive of the possibility 
that these insured households may not be fully protected against income and medical costs 
shocks.  
The results for the uninsured households and single households did not share as much  
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light on their savings behavior. The correlations for these more vulnerable groups are likely too 
complex and as such the scope of this analysis may not have fully captured them. Further 
research focusing on the sample of uninsured and single headed households and in particular on 
the family structure, such as single parent headed households with children, with no insurance, is 
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Table 1. Health and Savings Measures Summary 
Variable All  Singles  Married 
Demographics      
Average age  36.9  31.7  42.4 
Average years of education 13.9  13.2  14.6 
Non-Hispanic White  0.76  0.70  0.81 
Black 0.13  0.18  0.08 
Hispanic 0.12  0.12  0.11 
Female 0.52  0.53  0.52 
Health Measures       
% Sick  0.11  0.12  0.10 
No health insurance  0.17  0.21  0.11 
Median Doctor Visits Per Year  2  1  2 
Become Sick Within Survey       
                   w6-w3  4.8%  4.9%        4.7% 
                   w9-w6  4.6%  5.1%    4.3% 
Dependent Children  0.93 0.71  1.20 
      
 Any Financial Assets  0.57 0.44  0.73 
         Any Safe Assets  0.55  0.43  0.70 
         Any Medium Risk Assets  0.17  0.09  0.25 
         Any Risky Assets  0.21  0.12  0.30 
 Asset Fractions (cond. on owning)      
                    Fraction in Safe Assets  0.201 0.281  0.202 
                    Fraction in Medium Risk  0.672 0.573  0.696 
                    Fraction in Risky  0.128 0.146  0.102 
N 62091  20331  41760 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participitation Data Provided By NBER and CEPR.  
Note: The self-perceived health status question is asked once every 3 waves (once a year). It also reports statistics for wealth and 
asset ownership. Asset ownership for each type is reported every wave (every four months). We define “becoming sick between 











Table 2:  Probability of Holding Assets
N=36700  Safe Assets  Medium Risk Assets High Risk Assets
Characteristics  Healthy Sick Healthy Sick Healthy  Sick
All People  0.61 0.35 0.20 0.08 0.23  0.10
Marital Status        
Single  0.45 0.29 0.10 0.05 0.13  0.06
Couples  0.72 0.51 0.27 0.14 0.32  0.17
Insurance Coverage        
Uninsured  0.29 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.05  0.03
Insured  0.67 0.44 0.23 0.11 0.28  0.12
Racial/ethnicity        
Non-hispanic White  0.68 0.42 0.24 0.11 0.28  0.12
         Black  0.41 0.22 0.06 0.02 0.09  0.04
Hispanic  0.41 0.23 0.06 0.03 0.07  0.05
Poverty Status         
Poor  0.28 0.20 0.05 0.01 0.05  0.02
Non-Poor  0.65 0.41 0.21 0.10 0.27  0.13
Age Category        
25-34  0.59 0.39 0.14 0.08 0.20  0.11
35-44  0.67 0.44 0.23 0.11 0.29  0.14



























Table 3. Account Closings Between Years 
  Safe Assets  Medium Risk  Risky Assets 
  w6-w3  w9-w6 w6-w3 w9-w6 w6-w3  w9-w6
Singles          
All  0.06 0.11  0.10  0.11  0.16  0.15 
        Become Sick  0.06 0.13  0.07  0.10  0.25  0.20 
        Remain Healthy  0.06 0.10  0.10  0.10  0.16  0.15 
Uninsured            
        Become Sick  0.08 0.22  0.20  0.25  0.33  0.20 
        Remain Healthy  0.07 0.21  0.20  0.25  0.32  0.25 
Insured            
       Become Sick  0.05 0.12  0.03  0.06  0.24  0.21 
       Remain Healthy  0.05 0.08  0.09  0.08  0.13  0.13 
            
Couples            
All  0.05 0.06  0.09  0.09  0.15  0.14 
        Become Sick  0.07 0.10  0.16  0.05  0.22  0.16 
        Remain Healthy  0.05 0.06  0.09  0.09  0.15  0.13 
Uninsured            
        Become Sick  0.10 0.28  0.38  0.15  0.29  0.33 
        Remain Healthy  0.07 0.2  0.21 0.18 0.37  0.33 
Insured            
       Become Sick  0.06 0.07  0.14  0.05  0.21  0.15 
       Remain Healthy  0.04 0.05  0.09  0.09  0.14  0.13 
N (those starting w/ acct) 17567 17523 5900  6008  7606  7169 
 
Notes: we define uninsured as not having health insurance either in wave 3 or wave 6 and insured as having 






















































Table 4A. Asset Ownership Probabilities – Singles 
  Random Effects Probit  Fixed Effects Logit 








Health Status  -0.165   
(0.024) 
-0.165   
(0.040) 
-.1665818   
.0369384 
-.0105808   
.0477641 
.0299743   
.0902793 




-.6346877   
.0609898 
-.3267141   
.1059194   
-.7146474   
.1040156 
-.1726038   
.1191827 
.3274893     
.24752 
-.4395371    
.232341 
Doctor Visits  -.0028657     
.00241 
-.0012262   
.0042478 
.0017752   
.0033466 
.000657   
.0051945 
-.0011626   
.0120796 
-.0024066   
.0075199 
Age  .0272577  
.0047551 
.0771288    
.007191 
.0332247   
.0061584 
-.119858      
.0351 
.1139951   
.0618975 
-.5863645   
.0603873 
HH Income / 10
4  .5272739   
.0713638 
.4520709   
.0932055 
.5083972   
.0859157 
.5013502     
.14461 
.3139352   
.1966504 
.3177046   
.1732148 
Net Worth / 10
6 
.7026986   
.1417071 
.0867457   
.0413255 
.1237001   
.0462095 
.5013502     
.14461 
.6400971   
.4139058 
.7036836   
.3263158 
Some High School  -4.240042   
.1890667 
-8.366257   
.3914207 
-8.633813   
.3955256 
- -  - 
High School  -2.941766   
.1683443 
-3.778582   
.2792486 
-3.624917   
.2780555 
- -  - 
Some College  -1.933102    
.167936 
-2.842388   
.2596293 
-2.79044   
.2745789 
- -  - 
College  -.8186332   
.1608338 
-1.559547   
.2468926 
-1.619219   
.2721671 
-  -  - 
Female  -.013188   
.0836037 
-.1587918    
.109646 
-.5008479   
.1060432 
- -  - 
Black  -1.257787   
.1044219 
-1.993055   
.2986761 
-1.224896   
.1603058 
- -  - 
Constant  2.734901   
.2775957 
-2.708832   
.4303128 
-1.179205   
.3904328 

















































Table 4B. Asset  Ownership Probabilities – Couples 
  Random Effects Probit  Fixed Effects Logit 








Health Status  -.1353741   
.0183941 
-.1221098     
.02531 
-.1751293   
.0213645 
-.0243108    
.036688 
.0051686     
.05475 




-.948224   
.0584703 
-.7489051   
.1053535 
-.8104819   
.0879167 
-.4104154   
.1099903 
-.3164659   
.2316082 
-.016102   
.1943851 
Doctor Visits  .0033158   
.0017584 
.0036158   
.0022915 
.0041497   
.0020808 
.0021624   
.0032245 
.0055355   
.0049821 
.0011735   
.0042815 
Age  .0232059    
.003456 
.0873116   
.0048743 
.0206914   
.0039827 
-.0417162   
.0261243 
.0200205   
.0356518 
.1321979   
.0698877 
HH Income / 10
4  .6171337   
.0446246 
.3989883    
.046248 
.3671401   
.0385772 
.2275291   
.0828736 
.1554216   
.0832583 
  1.249489   
.1658523 
Net Worth / 10
6  .0040487   
.0066701 
.0297185   
.0157049 
1.960188   
.0819453 
.5571901   
.1810576 
1.117627   
.2021125 
-.3841326   
.0300945 
Some High School  -3.771187   
.1324491 
-7.467209   
.2273891 
-4.834449   
.2187476 
- -  - 
High School  -1.969636   
.1012658 
-3.397423   
.1610623 
-3.005456   
.1197767 
- -  - 
Some College  -1.12053   
.1019915 
-2.673464   
.1586567 
-2.20321   
.1223711 
- -  - 
College  -.3573149   
.0961873 
-1.214815   
.1532899 
-.8437637    
.117424 
-  -  - 
Female  -.0391892   
.0556664 
-.2326484   
.0709582 
-.284099   
.0638285 
- -  - 
Black  -1.307117   
.1054811 
-2.277444    
.231482 
-1.335311   
.1233934 
- -  - 
Constant  3.596617   
.2050559 
-2.19647   
.3097939 
.6053248   
.2370535 

















































Table 5: Risky Asset Ownership Probability By Insurance Coverage  
  Couples 
Fixed Effects Logits 
Single 
Fixed Effects Logits 








Health Status    .4234878   
.2986886 
-.1188505   
.0471522 
  -.3845923   
.3363519 
-.0059195   
.0996732 
Doctor Visits    .0546645   
.0753656 
.0001437   
.0042727 
  .1481996    
.158763 
-.0054894   
.0097917 
Age    -.1067825   
.2072237 
-.3915483   
.0311885 
  -.2468056   
.2250529 
-.6206377     
.06705 
HH Income / 10
4   2.625374     
1.270746 
.1267184   
.0716465 
  -.4819855   
1.367904 
.2698379   
.1836166 
Net Worth / 10
6    1.045299   
1.626687 
1.221431   
.1677375 
  1.828157   
2.777693 





Table 6. Average Asset Fraction Changes Between Years 
  Safe Assets  Medium Risk  Risky Assets 
  w6-w3 w9-w6  w6-w3  w9-w6  w6-w3  w9-w6 
Singles  .116  -.085  .308  .062  .069  -.003 
All            
        Become Sick  .044 .019  .235  .045  -.191  -.005 
        Remain Healthy  .139 -.083  .331  .065  .083  -.003 
Uninsured            
        Become Sick  -.032 -.043  -.027  -.282  -.190  .204 
        Remain Healthy  -.175 .028 .032  -.236  -.157  .044 
Insured            
       Become Sick  .070 .031  .312  .103  -.191  -.042 
       Remain Healthy  .200 -.105  .363  .100  .108  -.009 
            
Couples  -.017  -.007 .187  -.122  .160  -.015 
All            
        Become Sick  -.016 .014  -.142 -.103  -.049  -.013 
        Remain Healthy  -.020 -.008 .186  -.121  .077  -.015 
Uninsured            
        Become Sick  -.043 .036  -.044 -.344  -.393  .243 
        Remain Healthy  -.018 -.014  -.082  .040  3.36  -.033 
Insured            
       Become Sick  -.026 .010  -.150 -.090  -.044  -.029 
       Remain Healthy  -.020 -.008 .192  -.126  -.013  -.015 
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